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NOTE
IT’S COMMON SENSE: WHY THE COMMON
CORE IS NOT COERCIVE
Jeremy Bachrach Siegfried*
Education policy is one of the most hotly debated areas of American
politics.  The most recent debate relates to the Common Core.  While
many students, parents, teachers, and administrators vigorously support
it, others adamantly oppose it and urge their states to opt out.  Louisiana
is a state that attempted to opt out.  In Jindal v. United States Department
of Education, former Governor Bobby Jindal argued that the federal
government’s efforts to tie Race to the Top funding to state adoption of
the Common Core amounted to a violation of Congress’s power under
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.  Although the district court
rejected this claim and Louisiana then chose to drop the appeal, another
state in the same or different circuit may attempt to raise a similar claim
to challenge the policy.  This Note argues that the district court was cor-
rect to dismiss the complaint.  It looks to the history of both education
policy and Commerce Clause jurisprudence to establish that tying funds
to a goal amounts to an incentive and does not constitute a coercive act.
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“Teachers and principals in schools from Tennessee to
Washington, D.C., are making big strides in preparing
students with skills for the new economy—problem solv-
ing, critical thinking, science, technology, engineering,
and math. . . . It requires everything from more challeng-
ing curriculums and more demanding parents to better
support for teachers and new ways to measure how well
our kids think, not how well they can fill in a bubble on a
test.  But it’s worth it—and it’s working.”
—President Barack Obama1
“Let’s face it: Centralized planning didn’t work in Rus-
sia, it’s not working with our health care system, and it
won’t work in education.”
—former Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal2
INTRODUCTION
The state of our public education system is one of the most debated
issues in U.S. domestic policy today.  We alternately blame and praise
teachers, students, parents, administrators, local governments, state gov-
ernments, and the federal government for the successes and failures of
the system.  However, perhaps no education issue over the last decade
has provoked more controversy than the Common Core.  The stories in
the media are numerous: children learn to subtract by adding or they
break down in tears because they are not prepared for Common Core-
based tests.  Many parents are furious, as they do not understand the new
concepts being taught and feel helpless to aid their children.  Advocates
of Common Core also point to improved educational standards and read-
ing scores, as well as better preparation for college and the working
world.
1 Alyson Klein et al., Obama Sells Race to Top, Early-Childhood Education in State of
the Union, EDUC. WEEK (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.ccsso.org/News_and_Events/Current_
News/Obama_Sells_Race_to_Top_Early-Childhood_Education_in_State_of_the_Union.html.
2 David Freedlander, How the GOP Turned on Common Core, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 28,
2015), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/10/09/how-republicans-turned-common-core-37
7346.html.
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In the past few decades, education in the United States, as measured
by student performance, has fallen behind other countries in reading,
math, and science, leaving many students unprepared to enter the work-
place.3  In addition, dropout rates throughout the country are on the rise.
To address these problems and close the gap, in 2001, Congress passed
the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), which was an updated version of
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA).4  NCLB
put in place testing and accountability measures, requiring states to show
student growth and improvement in learning in order to remain eligible
for funds.5
The two most recent efforts to reform education, in response to the
so-called “Race to the Bottom,”6 are programs known as “Race to the
Top”7 (RTTT) and the Common Core Curriculum Standards (the Com-
mon Core).8  Race to the Top is a program administered by the Depart-
ment of Education to award federal grants to states.9  The program is
voluntary, and a state must participate only if it seeks certain federal
grants for education.10
For the Department of Education to properly evaluate state educa-
tion programs to determine grant awards, there must be a uniform set of
educational standards.11  It is difficult to evaluate and compare the suc-
cess of states and their reform plans against each other if the grade-level
3 See Lyndsey Layton, U.S. Students Lag Around Average on International Science,
Math and Reading Test, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
education/us-students-lag-around-average-on-international-science-math-and-reading-test/
2013/12/02/2e510f26-5b92-11e3-a49b-90a0e156254b_story.html.
4 See No Child Left Behind—Overview, NEW AMERICA (Apr. 24, 2014), http://
febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/no-child-left-behind-overview.
5 See id.  NCLB and its role in creating the Race to the Bottom will be explored later in
this Note.
6 See Jay P. Greene, Do We Need National Standards to Prevent a Race to the Bottom?,
EDUCATIONNEXT (July 17, 2012), http://educationnext.org/do-we-need-national-standards-to-
prevent-a-race-to-the-bottom.
7 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 14005,
123 Stat. 115, 282–83 (2009).
8 See Greene, supra note 6. R
9 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.
10 See id.
11 See Willona Sloan, Coming to Terms with Common Core Standards, INFO BRIEF (Dec.
2010), http://www.ascd.org/publications/newsletters/policy-priorities/vol16/issue4/full/Com-
ing-to-Terms-with-Common-Core-Standards.aspx.
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standards12 and tests differ across states.13  This is one reason the Depart-
ment of Education supported developing the Common Core.14  The goal
was to have each state adopt the Common Core and create a nationalized
core set of standards.15  The Common Core16 would inform state and
local agencies what standards students in each grade needed to meet by
the end of each year.17  While some states were eager to join and accept
this program, other states viewed it as an improper attempt by the federal
government to take over control of public school education and to dictate
to states what must be taught in their schools.18  Historically, control
over public school education has resided with the states, making the
adoption of the Common Core, in its critics’ views, a violation of states’
rights.19  To incentivize states to adopt these standards, Congress allowed
the Department of Education to award states points toward Race to the
Top grants for adopting the Common Core.20  Many states, despite this
incentive, have opted out of the program.21
This controversy has grown as states continue to opt out of the
Common Core, thereby becoming less competitive for grants.  In August
of 2014, Governor Bobby Jindal challenged the implementation of the
12 “Grade-level standards” is an educational term of art.  It is used to describe the stan-
dards a student will achieve in a specific grade year.  For example, a grade-level standard for
first grade may be that “students will be able to add two-digit numbers” by the end of first
grade.  A curriculum, by contrast, would take this standard and tell the teacher when and how
to teach this lesson.  For example, it would dictate the lesson be taught in December and by
using certain strategies.  Essentially, the grade-level standards tell teachers the goals their stu-
dents must achieve and the curriculum tells them how and when they must achieve them.
13 See Sloan, supra note 11 (quoting a speech by Secretary of Education Arne Duncan in
2009).
14 See id.; see also Frequently Asked Questions, COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS INI-
TIATIVE, http://www.corestandards.org/about-the-standards/frequently-asked-questions (last
visited Mar. 7, 2016).  The standards themselves were written by the National Governors As-
sociation Center for Best Practices and the Council of Chief State School Officers.  However,
it was an initiative of the Department of Education, for which it recruited these organizations.
Id.  Further involved were educational experts, teachers, parents, and school administrators.
Id.
15 See Sloan, supra note 11. R
16 For further details, see infra Part II.B.
17 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 11–12, Jindal v.
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 3:14-cv-534-SDD-RLB (M.D. La. Nov. 18, 2014) (“Academic con-
tent standards ‘specify what children are expected to know and be able to do.’”).
18 See Lyndsey Layton, Legislatures Taking Education into Their Own Hands, WASH.
POST (Aug. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/legislatures-taking-
state-education-into-their-own-hands/2014/08/02/71bec126-1745-11e4-9e3b-7f2f110c6265_
story.html.
19 See generally JAMES A. RAPP, EDUCATION LAW § 5.01 (2015).
20 See Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief at 6–7, Jindal v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 3:14-
cv-534-SDD-RLB (M.D. La. June 19, 2015). The Defendants refer to adopting “common
standards” and assessments, which may be accomplished by adopting the Common Core.  The
cited portion refers to RTTT-State but serves as evidence that Race to the Top grants are based
on points awarded, some of which may be acquired via Common Core adoption.
21 See Sloan, supra note 11. R
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Common Core as coercive.22  He argued that by encouraging its adoption
in Race to the Top awards, the government was not merely incentivizing
the use of the Common Core, but coercing them into using it, which is a
violation of states’ rights.23
This Note focuses not on the qualities of the Common Core but
rather on the litigation brought by the former Governor of Louisiana
challenging its constitutionality.  This Note concludes that, contrary to
the arguments advanced by Governor Jindal in Jindal v. United States
Department of Education,24 encouraging states to adopt the Common
Core by disbursing certain federal grants is not a coercive use of the
power of the purse but, in fact, a valid use of Congress’s spending
power.25
To place this controversy in context, this Note is divided into four
parts.  Part I reviews the history of financing for public school education
in the United States.  Part II reviews the educational reforms and criti-
cisms of those reforms put forward by the Obama administration.  Part
III reviews the history of Supreme Court rulings related to federal coer-
cion of states.  Part IV examines the case in Louisiana, renders a predic-
tion, and discusses the broad policy implications of the variety of
possible outcomes.
I. EVERY STATE FOR ITSELF—THE EARLY HISTORY OF EDUCATION
The public has long professed to value education, but has struggled
to properly fund and support public school education.26  It was believed
early in the nation’s history, dating back to colonial times, that the re-
sponsibility to educate fell to families and the church.27  Parents were
responsible for the growth and education of their children, but many par-
ents and adult non-parents were unwilling or hesitant to pay for educa-
tion because they saw the benefits of education as related only to
individual children and not to society as a whole.28  Given this sense of
individualism, it was difficult for local governments to raise money for
public education, leaving individual families to educate their own.29  At
22 See First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 56–70, Jindal v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 3:14-cv-
534-SDD-RLB (M.D. La. Dec. 10, 2014).
23 See id.
24 See id.
25 New Governor John Bel Edwards has since dropped the appeal to the Fifth Circuit of
the decision against Jindal.  While the analysis of the case will not be contemporaneous, it will
assert that not only was the District Court’s decision correct, but that any future attempt by a
governor in a different circuit to challenge the Common Core on these grounds will fail.
26 See generally RAPP, supra note 19. R
27 See id. § 5.01(2).
28 See id.  This concern of families became a recurring theme in future efforts to en-
courage public financing.
29 See id.
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the same time, local churches provided society’s moral compass and as a
result were also charged with educating the youth of the colonies.30  Edu-
cation was, in essence, local and without regulation.31
With the founding of the country, despite the development of a cen-
tral government charged with funding various programs for the states,
education remained local.32  As one writer noted, “The federal govern-
ment has no direct responsibility to educate.”33  The job of educating the
country’s youth was retained by the states under the Tenth Amend-
ment.34  States continued to leave the duty to local authorities but did
provide funds through state lotteries and applications for federal land
grants.35
This system soon became unmanageably expensive and ineffi-
cient.36  Children within states were receiving vastly different educations
and states could not continue to fund schools through the limited reve-
nues they were receiving.37  Change came in 1837 when Horace Mann
was elected as Secretary of Education in Massachusetts.38  Horace Mann
created the Common School system: schools across the state would use a
common system, and society would pay for them through direct and gen-
eral local taxes.39  In essence, the system would be standardized, and,
instead of paying for the program through lotteries and donations to the
church, there would be a secular system, which would be paid for by the
people.40  There were still parochial and private schools; however, par-
ents would have to pay for those on their own.41
While the federal government did provide money through impact
funds and land grants, its role in financing education was very limited
until the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, which effectively en-
ded segregation in schools.42  The controversial decision, however, re-
quired enforcement, which was best accomplished through federal
intervention.43  In the wake of the decision, the Department of Education




33 Id. § 5.01(3).




38 See Horace Mann (1796–1859), PBS, http://www.pbs.org/onlyateacher/horace.html
(last visited Jan. 26, 2016).
39 See id.
40 See id.; see also RAPP, supra note 19, § 5.01(2). R
41 See RAPP, supra note 19, § 5.01(2). R
42 See id. § 5.01(3)(e).
43 See id.
44 See id.
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pliance with the decision in Brown, Congress passed the ESEA, includ-
ing Titles IV and IX, both of which demanded equality in educational
opportunities.45  Additionally, Congress passed section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act and, much later, the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA) to enforce the rights of individuals with disabilities.46  These
programs were “carrot and stick” legislation intended to incentivize
equal educational opportunities and help states meet compliance costs,
which would have been impractical without federal assistance.47
Historically, there have been three funding sources for public educa-
tion.48  There are local funds from the city or district, usually funded
with taxes.49  There are also state funds usually financed through taxes.50
Finally, there are federal funds that states are eligible for if they comply
with certain standards.51  While the federal government will usually not
withhold funds from participating states that fail to comply with the stan-
dards after a grant is awarded, it does have a number of remedies, such as
administrative hearings, partial withholding, and intervention, that it will
employ if a state fails to comply.52  It must be emphasized, however, that
the federal government is under no duty to provide public funds to the
states.  All of these programs are optional.53
Through this entire process, states retained responsibility for educa-
tion.54  States are the primary source of funding for schools and retain a
great deal of discretion.55  Under the standards set forth in Butt v. State, a
decision by the California Supreme Court followed by most states, states
were required to provide educational opportunities to all students;56 how-
ever, under Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District, states
were not required to provide equal funding to all districts.57  States
merely needed to provide equal educational opportunities and could fund
schools in any way they wished as long as they could prove they were
45 See id.
46 See id.
47 See generally id.
48 See id. § 5.01(1).
49 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
50 See RAPP, supra note 19, § 5.01(4)(b)(i). R
51 See supra notes 41–46 and accompanying text.
52 See RAPP, supra note 19, § 5.01(7). R
53 See generally id.
54 See id. § 5.01(4)(a).
55 See id.; see also Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The
Example of Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 614–15 (2013) (noting that states
were given wide discretion to disburse federal Title I funds acquired through the Elementary
Secondary Education Act (ESEA) at the local level).
56 See Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1248 (Cal. 1992).
57 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60 (1973) (holding that
the Equal Protection Clause only applies when there is invidious discrimination and that it
does not apply in the context of school funding).  In fact, school districts had great discretion
in how they disbursed funds to schools. See Pasachoff, supra note 55, at 614–15. R
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not acting in an “invidiously discriminatory” manner.58  Thus, states dis-
bursed federal funds and paid the rest through local and state taxes.59
Then, in 2001, in what was perhaps the greatest overhaul of educa-
tion enacted in the United States, Congress passed No Child Left Behind
(NCLB).60  NCLB proved to be controversial, angering teachers, admin-
istrators, and parents alike.61  Funding was based on two main factors:
compliance with federal programs and student improvement.62  How-
ever, many states struggled to come into compliance to the extent re-
quired by NCLB: the cost of compliance was high and the financial
reward was very low, causing many states to grow resentful and resist
the standards imposed by NCLB.63  While the focus on student improve-
ment and data was well intentioned, the actual policy created an imbal-
ance: because states were able to set their own standards, student growth
in one state could not be reliably measured against that in another.64  As
such, low-performing states appeared to exploit this gap and lower their
standards to artificially inflate scores each year.65  This phenomenon was
termed the “Race to the Bottom,” in which states competed to have the
lowest standards in order to attain the highest rates of test score improve-
ment.  These gaps and the “Race to the Bottom” made NCLB highly
controversial.66
II. TENSIONS RISE: REFORMS UNDER THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
In 2008, when Barack Obama was elected President of the United
States, he promised education reform and greater accountability for
58 See RAPP, supra note 19, § 5.01(4)(a); see also Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 60. R
59 See RAPP, supra note 19, § 5.01(4)(a). R
60 See id.; see also Pasachoff, supra note 55, at 613–14. R
61 See Pasachoff, supra note 55, at 615. R
62 See id. at 615–19.
63 See id. at 615; see also RAPP, supra note 19, § 5.01(3)(g)(ii) (“Among other concerns R
has been that the costs of compliance outstrips the level of funding.”).
64 See Ending the Race to the Bottom, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/03/12/opinion/12thu1.html.  The writer notes that scores in Missis-
sippi and Wyoming on a national test were vastly different but students were achieving at
similar levels on state level tests.
65 See Greene, supra note 6.  In this way they could show student growth and acquire R
funds without actually improving the instruction students received or standards students at-
tempted to reach.
66 In December of 2015, Congress passed the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA).  It is
not yet clear what the impact of the new act is.  Likely, there will be greater local control over
educational decisions.  The biggest impact of ESSA seems to be that it releases states from
meeting NCLB’s 100% proficiency rate by the end of 2016.  However, most states had already
opted out of that goal.  The true nuts and bolts of ESSA remain to be seen, but it appears to gut
the core of NCLB, while having relatively little impact on the Common Core and Race to the
Top. See infra Part II.
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states, districts, schools, teachers, and students.67  He appointed Arne
Duncan as his Secretary of Education and charged him with reforming
the public education system of the country.  Working with Congress,
states, and education experts, Secretary Duncan developed and imple-
mented a two-pronged plan: first, the Race to the Top program to deter-
mine grants and contracts for states, and second, the Common Core to
standardize grade level standards for students in similar grades across
districts and states.68  To enhance their compatibility, Congress linked
the Race to the Top and the Common Core programs by offering in-
creased opportunity to qualify for Race to the Top grants to states that
included Common Core standards in state reform plans.69
A. Race to the Top
In 2009, Race to the Top, a voluntary federal grant program, passed
through both the House of Representatives and the Senate to become
law.70  The program had two methods to determine funding: require-
ments for eligibility to receive grants under the program, known as abso-
lute priorities, and factors to be considered by the department to
determine level of funding.71  This structure remains intact today.
The absolute priorities, which are similar to requirements for eligi-
bility, for certain Race to the Top grants are the State Reform Agenda,
standardized assessments, curriculum improvement, turn-around rates for
low-performing schools, and responsible “charterization.”72  Other fac-
tors, which are optional, not absolute, are used to determine the amount
of grants and are specific to each grant.73  The more factors a state meets,
the more points it receives toward various grants.74
There are a variety of grants available under Race to the Top and a
state need not adopt the Common Core to be eligible to receive some of
them.75  States that adopt standards that are more ambitious and oriented
toward college preparation receive more “high points” toward various
67 See Full Text of Obama’s Education Speech, DENVER POST (May 28, 2008), http://
www.denverpost.com/ci_9405199.
68 See Greene, supra note 6. R
69 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. R
70 See 34 C.F.R. subtit. B, ch. II (2009).
71 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 14005,
123 Stat. 115, 282–83 (2009).
72 See id.; see also Full Text of Obama’s Education Speech, supra note 67.  “Charteriza- R
tion” refers to the process by which a state or school district adds charter schools.  This can
occur through the development of new schools or the takeover of failing district schools and
their ensuing conversion to charter schools.
73 See 34 C.F.R. subtit. B, ch. II; see also American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009.
74 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 17. R
75 See id.
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grants.76  Race to the Top does not explicitly mention Common Core or
its adoption as a factor, but adoption of “common [national] standards”
helps qualify a state for the curriculum development and standardized
assessments priorities, which is one of the absolute priorities.77  Thus,
while some grants require adoption of the Common Core, most do not.
Furthermore, full or partial grants are still available without adoption,
although accumulating higher points without Common Core will be diffi-
cult.78  In essence, a state may receive at least partial grants for improv-
ing its curriculum or assessments without adopting Common Core if it
can prove such improvements in another way.79
B. Common Core Curriculum Standards
In 2009, when Congress passed legislation enacting the Race to the
Top program, it also approved the Common Core Curriculum Stan-
dards.80  The Department of Education then used it as one way to meet
priorities in calculating RTTT awards.81  The Common Core sets forth a
set of uniform standards but the flexibility of states to change the stan-
dards is limited.  The Common Core seeks to prepare students for college
and professional life, as well as bring states into alignment with each
other.82  As such, it focuses on nonfiction works in English, interdiscipli-
nary work between courses, and STEM courses.83  It also emphasizes
developing in students a deep understanding of a select few topics within
a given subject as opposed to cursory, superficial knowledge of a wide
breadth of topics within the subject.84  States that adopt these standards
76 See id. at 5–7.
77 See id. at 7 n.4. (“Scores also took into account the date by a which a State committed
to adopting common standards . . . with ‘high’ points awarded.”).
78 See Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 20, at 6–7. R
79 See id.
80 See Greene, supra note 6. R
81 See Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 20, at 7–8, 10.  Participation in the R
programs was not required to meet priorities or require funding, but these pages imply that
states adopting the Common Core received “high points” toward their eligibility.
82 See id. at 11–13.
83 See Key Design Consideration, COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS INITIATIVE, http://
www.corestandards.org/ELA-Literacy/introduction/key-design-consideration (last visited Apr.
12, 2016); Key Shifts in English Language Arts, COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS INITIA-
TIVE, http://www.corestandards.org/other-resources/key-shifts-in-english-language-arts (last
visited Apr. 12, 2016); Larry Edmonds & Cindy Moss, Are We Shifting Too Much Focus to
STEM?, INT’L SOC’Y FOR TECH. IN EDUC. (May 30, 2014), http://www.iste.org/explore/article
Detail?articleid=18&category=point-counterpoint&article=are-we-shifting-too-much-focus-to-
STEM-Yes.
84 See The Hechinger Report, The Common Core Math Standards: Content and Contro-
versy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/special-
reports/articles/2014/02/25/the-common-core-math-standards-content-and-controversy (focus-
ing on how math standards focus on depth of understanding); see also For Families, NORTH
PENN SCH. DIST., http://www.npenn.org/Domain/1182 (last visited Jan. 29, 2016).
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may add standards of their own, and they and the districts may teach the
material in any order using any books they wish, so long as they meet the
Common Core standards.85
The benefits of this system are numerous.  Students moving be-
tween states will continue to be held to the same standards and learn the
same material.86  Evaluations of state improvement are more consistent
because, rather than reducing their students’ standards to artificially in-
flate scores, all states use the same standards.  Also, students engage in
deeper study of each topic rather than a cursory and superficial review of
many topics, which leads to a more thorough understanding of each
topic.87  The emphasis on tracking and analyzing student data should
also, in theory, better inform instruction and help struggling students im-
prove while teaching high-performing students at their level.88  Finally,
because of its emphasis on science and math, as well as its interdiscipli-
nary focus, the Common Core has the potential to better prepare students
for higher education and an increasingly technological workplace.
The Common Core does have some significant weaknesses, how-
ever.  Most notably, the Common Core focuses heavily on nonfiction
reading, often at the expense of important works of fiction.89  The
Obama Administration has emphasized preparing students for college
and the workplace.90  The Common Core reflects this shifted emphasis as
it focuses on developing real-life skills by focusing on historical events
and scientific innovations.  This focus, supporters argue, allows students
to practically apply the skills and lessons they learn.91  Critics claim that
works of fiction can teach children just as much about real life as nonfic-
85 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 17, at R
7–8, 11.
86 See Frequently Asked Questions, COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS INITIATIVE, http://
www.corestandards.org/about-the-standards/frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Apr. 20,
2016).
87 See The Hechinger Report, supra note 84. R
88 See Joshua Bleiberg & Darrell West, In Defense of the Common Core Standards,
BROOKINGS CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION 8, 10–11 (2014), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
research/files/papers/2014/03/common-core-state-standards/bleiberg_west_common-core-
state-standards.pdf.  A teacher can look for areas of weakness for each student using statistics
to help them improve their instruction of each student.  In turn, this should help raise test
scores, as students receive more tailored and individual attention.
89 See Common Core Nonfiction Reading Standards Mark the End of Literature, English
Teachers Say, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/10/
common-core-nonfiction-reading-standards_n_2271229.html.
90 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 14005,
123 Stat. 115, 282–83 (2009).
91 See id.
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tion works.92  Thus, there is a concern that the Common Core’s emphasis
on nonfiction work may prevent children from exploring fiction.93
Another major concern of Common Core critics is that it overly
relies on data, such as end-of-year test scores.94  This concern manifests
itself in two ways.  First, teachers are concerned that their evaluations
will be based more on data from their students’ year-end scores, thereby
leading them to teach for the purpose of increasing test scores, which is
also known as “teaching to the test.” This causes “a problem for teachers
now dependent on good scores to achieve a rating that didn’t also put
their job in jeopardy.”95  This system also requires them to perform more
work with no additional pay,96 which could drive away potential strong,
new teachers while burning out existing ones.
A second concern of critics is that teachers will unfairly lose their
jobs because of factors beyond their control.97  Test scores are often af-
fected by a variety of outlying factors, such as test phrasing and students’
anxiety, medication, family situation, and sleep, among others.98  Fur-
thermore, because state tests have not yet been aligned with Common
Core Standards, teachers and experts worry that the year-end tests will
not accurately reflect their efforts or what the students learned, as teach-
92 See Bleiberg & West, supra note 88.  This concern may be unfounded, however; the R
nonfiction requirement may be met through use of nonfiction in classes other than English
Language Arts (ELA) classes, meaning ELA classes can likely continue to use fiction works at
the same rate they did prior to the adoption of CCSS.  Therefore, it is possible there may not
be the reduction in teaching fiction that was initially expected.
93 See id.
94 See Stan Karp, The Problems with the Common Core, RETHINKING SCHOOLS, http://
www.rethinkingschools.org/archive/28_02/28_02_karp.shtml (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).
95 See Amanda M. Fairbanks, Will Test-Based Teacher Evaluations Derail the Common
Core?, THE HECHINGER REPORT (Jan. 8, 2015), http://hechingerreport.org/content/will-test-
based-teacher-evaluations-derail-common-core_18694.
96 Grading tests, tracking student data, and then formulating new lesson plans around this
data can add countless additional hours to weekends or evenings.  Normally, a teacher writes
lesson plans and grades tests on weekends.  Thus, without overtime pay, there is additional
work at no additional pay over what a teacher might have to do in a non-data based system.
97 See Karp, supra note 94.  Teachers may be concerned that if their statistics for student
performance drop, they will lose their jobs.  However, student test scores on year-end tests
may be based on more than just their raw knowledge.  Factors such as problems at home, sleep
the night before a test, test anxiety, lack of medication on test day, or other factors far outside
of the teacher’s control could lead to students performing below their abilities but reflecting
negatively on teachers.
98 See Max Ehrenfreund, How Random Events During Standardized Tests Affect Your
Scores and Future Income, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/11/04/how-chance-events-during-standardized-tests-affect-your-
scores-and-future-income (explaining that factors such as crime near a school can affect test
scores); see also Richard Rothstein et al., Problems with the Use of Student Test Scores to
Evaluate Teachers, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Aug. 29, 2010), http://www.epi.org/files/page/-/pdf/
bp278.pdf (explaining that factors such as socioeconomic background can affect access to
resources such as tutors, which can create gaps in how students perform and affect teacher
scores).
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ers cannot control the year-end test scores for which they are held
accountable.99
Finally, the implementation of the Common Core has been difficult
for many teachers, schools, and districts.  Teachers often struggle to
communicate concepts using Common Core methods.  It demands giving
students partial credit and using teaching concepts in several different
ways,100 while providing very little training in the new standards.101  As
a result, some teachers struggle to find the right communicative language
and feel as though they have simply wasted their time and confused the
students.102  Thus, while the Common Core provides guidelines on how
to teach a subject, it fails to provide teachers the tools to effectively com-
municate the subjects.103
As a policy, the Common Core is highly controversial.  It presents
opportunities for student growth, uniformity in the education system
across the country, and equitable determinations for funding.  However,
at the same time, it leaves potential curricular and pedagogical holes.  It
also may lead to teachers being unfairly held accountable for test scores
that are out of their control, leading to potentially unfair teacher evalua-
tions.  Finally, given that it emphasizes strategy and arguably endorses a
curriculum tailored to that strategy, it leads many to believe that the fed-
eral government has overreached by legislating a state-controlled matter.
III. FORCING THE ISSUE—A HISTORY OF COERCIVE SPENDING
Congress may not use its spending power to coerce states into ac-
cepting federal programs.104  However, the Supreme Court has histori-
cally been reluctant to find congressional spending to be a violation of
99 See Diana Pullin, Getting to the Core: Rewriting the No Child Left Behind Act for the
21st Century, 39 RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 10–11 (2011) (explaining that states vary in the tests and
standards that they use making it difficult to evenly assess schools and teachers, particularly
with regard to how they teach the Common Core).
100 See The Hechinger Report, supra note 84.  This Article shows how math standards can R
be confusing to communicate, as teachers are expected to go beyond teaching concepts in
traditional methods (such as how slices of pizza are fractions) and instead show how fractions
fall on a number line.  While such concepts are important, communicating them is difficult and
some fear the Common Core overemphasizes them.  Another example of using different meth-
ods, that is not highlighted in the Article, is by teaching subtraction using addition skills.
These abstract skills, while potentially useful, are difficult to communicate and younger stu-
dents may struggle to grasp them.
101 See Alexandria Neason, Are Teachers Really Ready for the Common Core?, BOSTON




104 See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that the adoption of
drinking age of twenty-one is a valid inducement for the receipt of federal highway funds and
is not coercion).
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the Commerce Clause.105  Early jurisprudence deferred to congressional
discretion in use of the Commerce Clause, such as congressional legisla-
tion incentivizing states to regulate wheat consumption106 or to adopt a
drinking age of twenty-one.107  However, in 2012, the Supreme Court
ruled that Congress’s use of the Commerce Clause in the Affordable
Care Act to mandate that citizens purchase health insurance was coer-
cive.108  This section will track the history of coercion and the Com-
merce Clause.
The major case to articulate the legal standard regarding coercion is
South Dakota v. Dole.  The Twenty-First Amendment reserves to states
the power to legislate the drinking age.109  In the 1980s, however, Con-
gress and the Reagan Administration sought to encourage states to adopt
a drinking age of twenty-one by using a financial incentive: failure to
adopt the drinking age would result in forfeiture of highway construction
funds.110  Congress justified this legislation by stating that highways
were a tool of interstate commerce since they ran between states and
facilitated commerce and that it maintained an interest in keeping the
roads safe from drunk drivers.111  South Dakota challenged the legisla-
tion as a coercive use of the spending power.112  The federal government
argued that it was not coercive, but was instead a valid inducement to
adopt the federal policy.113  The Supreme Court held that Congress’s in-
terest in preventing drunk driving rendered the use of highway funds and
a drinking age rationally related.114  It also held that because the govern-
ment withheld only a “relatively small percentage” of the federal high-
way funds, the actions constituted “pressure” more than they did
“compulsion” and thus were valid.115 Dole showed that the Supreme
Court was reluctant to overrule Congress and would uphold most uses of
Congress’s spending power.
However, twelve years later, the Supreme Court held against the
federal government’s use of its spending power in New York v. United
States.116  To deal with the rising problem of radioactive waste, Congress
passed the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of
105 See id. at 209.
106 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129–130 (1942).
107 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 206.
108 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603–04 (2012).
109 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 205 (citing Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Alumi-
num, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980)).
110 See id. at 208–09.
111 See id.
112 See id. at 205–06.
113 See id. at 206.
114 See id. at 208–209.
115 See id. at 211.
116 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 154 (1992).
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1985, which provided monetary incentives to states to dispose of their
waste by 1992 or to “take title” to the waste at their own cost on January
1, 1993.117  New York claimed that both options were equally objection-
able since the state did not have a choice to participate, and, the state
claimed, the policy violated the Tenth Amendment.  The Supreme Court
held that while creating monetary incentives for states to clean up their
waste was a valid use of the spending power, the “take title” clause was
not.118  The Court deemed it coercive, holding that the states had no
choice but to participate in the program; states did not have the ability to
abstain from cleaning and therefore were punished for their non-partici-
pation by cleaning at their own cost and accepting all liabilities.119
In 2006, in Arlington Central School District Board of Education v.
Murphy, the Arlington Central School District Board of Education chal-
lenged the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) after it
was required to pay legal fees for a student following a successful court
action by the parents.120  The Supreme Court debated whether the IDEA,
which was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause, required districts re-
ceiving IDEA funds to pay for students’ legal fees, when the Act said
parents were entitled to recover them.121  The Court held that Congress
had discretion to disburse educational funds and could attach conditions
to these funds, so long as the conditions were “clear and unambiguous”
and led to “knowing and voluntary acceptance” by the states.122  In other
words, a statute creating conditional funding for states needed to be un-
ambiguous in order to be not coercive.
In 2012, in the case of National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of what quali-
fied as federal coercion.123  Under the Affordable Care Act, the federal
government was permitted to withdraw Medicaid funds from states if the
state failed to comply with expanded Medicaid requirements.124  The
Court held that because the expanded Medicaid program was so large, it
qualified as its own new program, and therefore, federal funds for the
pre-existing Medicaid program could not be withdrawn for noncompli-
ance.125  In essence, the Supreme Court held that despite being called an
117 See id. at 152–54.
118 See id. at 176.
119 See id.
120 See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 295 (2006).
121 See id.
122 See id. at 295–96.
123 See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (holding
that conditioning the receipt of federal Medicaid funds on acceptance of expanded Medicaid
program was an unconstitutional coercive use of spending power).
124 See id. at 2581–82.
125 See id. at 2606 (“Indeed, the manner in which the expansion is structured indicates
that while Congress may have styled the expansion a mere alteration of existing Medicaid, it
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expansion, the Medicaid provision acted as an entirely new program.  As
such, according to the Supreme Court, states needed to have the ability to
collect Medicaid funds that had previously been available from the fed-
eral government prior to the “expansion” as long as those states had pre-
viously been in compliance with the pre-expansion Medicaid program.126
Thus, in Sebelius, the Supreme Court made clear that not only must the
use of federal funds be reasonably related to the condition applied, but
also that the federal government could not withhold funds for an existing
federal program based on a state’s noncompliance with a new federal
program.127
IV. INCENTIVES OR STRONG-ARM POLITICS: THE ANALYSIS
One of the most recent cases to address coercion of states through
federal funding operations is Jindal v. United States Department of Edu-
cation, which asks whether, as described in the Race to the Top legisla-
tion, awarding points based on a state’s adoption of the Common Core is
a coercive use of the spending power.128  The case was recently appealed
to the Fifth Circuit after the Department of Education won in the Middle
District Court of Louisiana.129  This section analyzes the arguments
made by both sides and the District Court regarding federal coercion.130
A. The Case in Louisiana
In August of 2014, Governor Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, a former
supporter of the Common Core, sued the Department of Education and
its secretary, Arne Duncan, alleging that the federal government coerced
the State of Louisiana into adopting the Common Core by threatening to
withhold Race to the Top funds if the state opted out of the Common
Core.131
recognized it was enlisting the States in a new health care program.”); see also Pasachoff,
supra note 55, at 593.  The Supreme Court did not address whether Congress could withhold R
funds associated with the new project for failure to comply.  However, it is likely that such
standards would follow a Dole analysis and would be acceptable.
126 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2607.
127 See id. at 2608.
128 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶ 65. R
129 Id.
130 This analysis will proceed under the hypothetical in which the new governor contin-
ued with the appeal, which was filed prior to his election, even though he has since dropped
the appeal.  The same analysis would also apply if another governor chooses to bring the same
lawsuit against the Department of Education and explains why the District Court was correct
in its decision.
131 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶ 65.
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1. Does the Governor Have Standing?
The first hurdle for the Governor to clear in his lawsuit was to prove
he had standing.  The Department of Education moved to dismiss, claim-
ing that Governor Jindal lacked standing to bring this claim.132  The De-
partment made two arguments: first, Jindal was not injured in his
capacity as governor; second, if Jindal was seeking standing as a repre-
sentative of the state, the state of Louisiana was not harmed and had not
shown potential for irreparable harm.133
As to the first point, the Department argued, Jindal was not harmed
as governor because he did not make decisions regarding education and
curriculum.134  In the state of Louisiana, these decisions are made by the
Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE) and the Superin-
tendent of Education—in this case, John White.135  As such, the Depart-
ment argued, Governor Jindal could not be harmed in his capacity as
governor because his decision-making power had not been infringed
upon.136
The Department also contended that Governor Jindal could not
bring this claim on behalf of the state of Louisiana because he could not
allege redressability.137  In this case, the Department argued that Gover-
nor Jindal could not show actual harm because both the BESE and Su-
perintendent of Education, which possess the ultimate decision-making
power, support the Common Core.138  According to the Department,
even if the Court were to rule that adoption of the Common Core was
coercive, it would lead to no change in policy since the state would likely
continue to use the Common Core.139
Finally, citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Department ar-
gued that the Governor had not alleged any actual harm as to lost
funds.140  Harm must be “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypo-
thetical” under Lujan.141  The Department argued that because Louisiana
132 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 17, at 19; R
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint at 1, Jindal v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
No. 3:14-cv-534-SDD-RLB (M.D. La. Dec. 12, 2014).
133 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 17, at R
18–25.
134 See id. at 22.
135 See id. at 23.
136 See id. at 23–24; Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 20, at 12.  Although not R
noted as an argument in the Department’s Motion to Dismiss, the Legislature voted to adopt
both the Common Core and RTTT, further undermining Jindal’s standing to claim harm.
137 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 17; see R
also Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 20, at 12. R
138 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 17, at 24. R
139 See id.; see also Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 20, at 12. R
140 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 17, at 19. R
141 See id. at 18; see also Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 20, at 3.  Both R
sources cite Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
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had not opted out of the Common Core, it had not lost federal funds, and
because it may not lose funds, allegations of harm are premature and
speculative.142
Governor Jindal argued, in opposition, that he had standing as a
representative of Louisiana, which he claims has been harmed by the
Common Core because it is not free to make its own choices regarding
education, a right guaranteed to states by the Tenth Amendment, the
General Education Provisions Act of 1965 (GEPA), and the No Child
Left Behind Act.143  Governor Jindal claimed that the Common Core re-
quires the state to implement so many objectives and methods that the
state is left with little ability to develop its own curriculum, leading to
irreparable harm.144  Jindal further contended, using a declaration from
educational expert Williamson M. Evers, that the Common Core is the
only readily available set of standards that would allow the State to accu-
mulate enough points to qualify for RTTT.145
The Department’s argument seemed to be the stronger of the two
because Governor Jindal could not make the decision to opt out.  How-
ever, Governor Jindal’s argument won, and the Court agreed that he had
standing, ensuring the likelihood that the issue will be decided by a judge
who President Obama appointed and who may therefore look upon the
Obama Administration’s policies favorably.
2. Governor Jindal’s Arguments
The focus of Governor Jindal’s claim was that governance over edu-
cation is primarily a state function.146  His argument was supported by
the history of education policy in the country, as discussed in Part I of
this Note.147  In paragraph 9 of the Jindal v. United States Department of
Education complaint, Governor Jindal cited the GEPA in support of this
premise:
No provision of any applicable program shall be con-
strued to authorize any department, agency, officer, or
employee of the United States to exercise any direction,
142 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 17, at 19. R
143 See Post-Hearing Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 8,
Jindal v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 14-cv-534-SDD-RLB (M.D. La. Dec. 12, 2014).
144 See id.  Governor Jindal supports these assertions with the declaration of Williamson
M. Evers, a Research Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution who is an educational
expert. See generally Exhibit A: Declaration of Williamson M. Evers, Jindal v. U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., No. 14-cv-00534 (M.D. La. Dec. 12, 2014) [hereinafter Exhibit A].
145 See Exhibit A, supra note 144, ¶ 7.  The Department counters this argument by noting R
that Georgia and Kentucky did not adopt the Common Core and actually created their own
standards in conjunction with certain Common Core standards that left them eligible for RTTT
and they, in fact, received some funds.
146 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶¶ 9–14. R
147 See supra Part I.
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supervision, or control over the curriculum, program of
instruction, administration, or personnel of any educa-
tional institution, school, or school system, or over the
selection of library resources, textbooks, or other printed
or published instructional materials by any educational
institution or school system . . . .148
He also alleged in the complaint that NCLB does not grant the Depart-
ment of Education power to mandate or even to endorse a curriculum,
and instead explicitly reserves these powers to the states.149  Jindal also
argued that the Department of Education Organization Act (DEOA),
which formed the Department of Education, severely limits the power of
the Department of Education and gives it little control over state curric-
ula.150  If Jindal were correct that, under the DEOA, the federal govern-
ment has no power to mandate a curriculum and that the power to do so
is reserved to the states, then any federal action mandating a state to
adopt a particular curriculum is coercive.151
Governor Jindal contended, therefore, that various RTTT require-
ments amount to coercive government action.152  First, he argued that the
Common Core is essentially a curriculum, and, accordingly, the Depart-
ment cannot coerce the state into accepting it.153  Based upon testimony
from educational expert William Everson of Stanford to support his argu-
ment, Governor Jindal claimed that the materials of Common Core act as
a curriculum, even if the government characterizes them as standards, or
benchmarks, for students to achieve by the end of the year.154  Jindal
argued that given its emphasis on scripts, objectives, methods, and
pedagogy, the Common Core leaves little room for states and districts to
write their own curricula, as they must use and follow these tools to meet
the standards set forth by the Common Core.155
Next, Jindal argued that the state reform criteria in RTTT essentially
require his state to adopt the Common Core.156  Under RTTT, awards
and eligibility are based on states’ accumulation of “high” and “low”
points.157  “High points” are awarded for adopting standards in conjunc-
148 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶ 9. R
149 See id. ¶ 13.
150 See id. ¶¶ 11–12.
151 The Department does not challenge this premise and instead argues that its policies are
not coercive because they are not curricula.
152 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶ 66. R
153 See id. ¶¶ 5–6, 9–14, 16; see also Exhibit A, supra note 144, at 1. R
154 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶¶ 5–6. R
155 See Post-Hearing Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 143, at 1. R
156 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶¶ 22–24. R
157 See id. ¶¶ 6–7, 23; see also Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dis-
miss, supra note 17, at 7 n.4; Exhibit A, supra note 144, at 6–7. R
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tion with “common national standards,” while using other standards may
result in only “low points.”158  Jindal argued this split prevents the state
from acquiring enough points to qualify or win an award, since states
cannot write their own standards in a way that would receive high
points.159  Similar to the government’s radioactive waste program in New
York v. United States,160 he argued, the government presents Common
Core as a choice, but in reality it is not: a state must either participate in
the Common Core to accumulate enough points to qualify for federal
funding under RTTT, or fund education on its own.161  Essentially, this
double-edged sword of two equally objectionable possibilities makes the
action coercive.162
Finally, Jindal argued that various provisions in RTTT essentially
require that the state adopt the Common Core.163  He argued that to qual-
ify for RTTT a state must use student assessments based on a “common
set of K–12 standards.”164  Because there are no equivalent standards
that will meet “common . . . standards,”165 he argued, the failure to use
the Common Core will lead to forfeiture of certain grants, which are
substantial.166  As an example, Jindal alleged, the lack of an equivalent
requires a state to adopt the Common Core in order to receive funding
for assessments under the Comprehensive Assessment Systems portion
of the bill.167  The Governor also argued that one of the RTTT programs,
RTTT-District, specifically mandates adoption of the Common Core.168
As such, Jindal argued that the state could potentially lose a great deal of
federal money by not adopting the Common Core, making the policy
coercive.169
3. The Department’s Arguments
The Department’s key argument was that the Common Core is not a
curriculum, but a set of standards:
158 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶¶ 6–7, 24; see also Memorandum in R
Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 17, at 7 n.4. R
159 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶ 24; see also Memorandum in Support R
of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 17, at 7 n.4; Exhibit A, supra note 144, at 6–7. R
160 See supra Part III.
161 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶ 68. R
162 See id.
163 See id. ¶¶ 1–2, 22–24.
164 See id. ¶ 23.
165 See Exhibit A, supra note 144, at 2. R
166 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶¶ 67–70. R
167 See id. ¶¶ 25–31; see also Exhibit A, supra note 144, at 1–2.  Without these funds, R
states may struggle to write strong year-end tests.  As such, access to funds may be imperative
for writing good tests and thus, showing improvement to acquire more funds.
168 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶¶ 32–33. R
169 See id. ¶¶ 67–70.
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Content standards are not the equivalent of a curriculum;
rather, content standards describe the competencies stu-
dents should acquire in each grade and subject, i.e., what
skills students should have, while curriculum consists of
the resources, approaches, and materials used in instruc-
tion as well as the pace and sequencing for providing
that instruction, i.e., how to teach those skills.  Thus,
adoption of common content standards does not involve
adoption of curriculum, which is left to the discretion of
State and local education leaders.170
Though the standards may discuss pedagogy, methods, and objectives,
they are merely the suggested methods and year-end goals for students to
obtain.171  The state still has the power and authority to establish the
curriculum in order to meet these standards, or, in other words, the abil-
ity to decide how to teach lessons, what materials to use, and the order in
which to teach subjects.172  According to the Department, the govern-
ment is not forcing a curriculum on the state since Common Core is not a
curriculum.173
The Department also argued that even if the Common Core were to
be considered a curriculum, it is not forced on the states.174  It attempted
to illustrate this in several ways.  First, it argued, awards are based on
points achieved.175  Therefore, the Common Core only amounts to a cer-
tain number of points that would qualify a state for a grant.176  Despite
the Governor’s claim that adopting the Common Core is the only way to
acquire the necessary points, the Department contended, these points can
in fact be acquired even in the absence of Common Core adoption.177  It
specifically cited to grants awarded to Georgia and Kentucky, which
170 Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 17, at 3. R
171 See id. at 11.  In fact, the motion to dismiss quotes the Louisiana BESE website:
[T]he Common Core State Standards are not a curriculum.  The standards are a set of
goals and expectations adopted by Louisiana to better prepare students to be college-
and career-ready.  Local school districts and teachers are responsible for defining the
curriculum, lessons and materials used in their schools to meet the standards.
Frequently Asked Common Core Questions, BESE, http://bese.louisiana.gov/current-initia-
tives/common-core-faq (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).  Thus, standards are not the substance of
what students are taught or how they are taught, but instead are lists or descriptions of learning
goals, or the skills students need to learn for a subject in each grade.
172 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 17, at R
11–12.
173 See id.
174 See id. at 19.
175 See id. at 6–9; see also Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 20, at 6–8. R
176 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 17, at R
6–9; see also Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 20, at 6–8. R
177 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 17, at R
6–9; see also Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 20, at 6–9. R
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both opted out of the Common Core after previously adopting it, in order
to write their own standards.178
Furthermore, the Department argued, Common Core is not listed as
an “absolute” priority for funding.179  Absolute priorities are require-
ments to be eligible for RTTT funds.180  To argue its point in its post-
hearing brief to dismiss, the Department cited the RTTT website:
B-2. If a State does not meet a selection criterion, or
does not respond to one, is it still eligible to compete for
a Race to the Top grant?
Yes. Each selection criterion has a point value. (For
more detail, see Appendix B, Scoring Rubric, published
in each of the notices.) Under absolute priority 1, States
must comprehensively address the four education reform
areas specified in the [American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act of 2009], but they are not required to address
every selection criterion. If a State does not address a
criterion, it will not receive points in that area, but it will
still be eligible to compete. If a State addresses the crite-
rion, but does so only partially or poorly, it may receive
partial or no points as determined by peer reviewers. If a
State receives partial or no points on a criterion, it may
still win if the overall application score is high
enough.181
It went on to explain that the Common Core is a part of these selection
criteria as opposed to a requirement.182  Therefore, it amounts to a part of
the score toward an absolute priority.183  It is not, in and of itself, an
absolute priority, but it may help a state meet one, and a failure to adopt
the Common Core will not prevent a state from meeting the absolute
priority.184  Therefore, because it is not an absolute requirement, a state
may be eligible for some RTTT grants or partial RTTT grants even with-
out the Common Core.185  Additionally, RTTT-State—which is another
RTTT grant program operating differently and separately from RTTT-
178 See Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 20, at 9. R
179 See id. at 7.
180 See id. at 6–7.
181 See id. (citing Race to the Top Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/faq.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2016)).
182 See id. at 7.
183 See id.
184 See id.
185 See id. at 7, 9.
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District—does not require adoption of the Common Core.186  It serves as
evidence that adoption of the Common Core is not mandatory for all
funding, and that a state can receive some RTTT grants without adopting
the Common Core.187  As such, unlike the facts in New York, a state has
the ability not to participate in the Common Core and still receive federal
funding.188  In short, a state can participate in a national education pro-
gram to the extent that it wishes and is not faced with two equally objec-
tionable options.189
The Department also claimed that the bill allows states to fully or
partially withdraw from the Common Core with no threat of penalty.190
If a state chooses to withdraw from the program or partially withdraw, it
may still be able to receive some RTTT funds that it earned prior to the
introduction of the Common Core, and thus will not be sacrificing previ-
ously available RTTT funds.  Furthermore, a state certainly will not sac-
rifice previously available NCLB funds, which would help counter a
potential Sebelius claim.191
B. Discussion
On balance, the Department of Education appeared to have stronger
arguments.  While the Governor was correct that the Common Core dic-
tates for the state much of what students must accomplish as educational
goals, the Department was also correct that it leaves for states a great
deal of decision-making regarding curricula.192  States can choose their
books, pacing charts, lessons, and order of lessons.193  These factors are
the essence of a curriculum.  As such, the Common Core is not a curricu-
lum or an equivalent of a curriculum that the federal government
mandates.
Furthermore, as the Department noted, the Common Core is only
one factor it considers when deciding state grants, and then it only con-
siders adoption of the Common Core in deciding just a few grants.  There
are many grants for states to receive which do not require Common Core
186 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 17, at 6–7 R
(noting that adoption by a state led to an award of twenty points but was not decisive to
whether the state received a grant).
187 See id. at 7.
188 See id. at 6–8.
189 See Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 20, at 8–9. R
190 See id.
191 See Myths vs. Facts, COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS INITIATIVE, http://
www.corestandards.org/about-the-standards/myths-vs-facts (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
192 See id.
193 See id.  The factors mentioned above go into the website’s definition of “devis[ing]
lesson plans and tailor[ing] instruction to the individual needs of the students in the
classrooms.”
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adoption.194  Adoption of the Common Core helps in obtaining points for
those grants, but it is still not officially required to qualify for an
award.195  A state may choose how competitive it wishes to be for highly
competitive grants such as RTTT-District, but the failure to receive those
competitive grants does not prevent the state from receiving other grants
or previously available federal funds.196  Furthermore, a state can still be
competitive even if it adopts only elements of the Common Core for its
standards, as was demonstrated by Georgia and Kentucky.197  Essen-
tially, a state can receive federal money whether or not it adopts the
Common Core and is not left with “two equally objectionable” choices.
Furthermore, as the Department argued, Governor Jindal failed to
allege a way in which the Common Core harms students.  The Depart-
ment was correct in noting that Louisiana will likely continue to use the
Common Core, meaning that the Governor alleged hypothetical harm,
not actual harm.198
In addition, the federal government appeared to have a strong inter-
est in educating public school students, and this spending is rationally
related to that interest.  The United States has struggled to educate its
students, who represent the next wave of the workforce.  It is therefore
crucial to the future of the country, both socially and economically, that
the future workforce be educated and skilled.  The federal government
was therefore furthering this nationwide interest by helping pay for the
education of its children.  Thus, this spending and these programs are
rationally related to that interest.
Finally, the policy appeared to meet both Dole and Sebelius stan-
dards of rational relation to government interest and expansion of a pre-
viously existing program.  The federal government would appear to have
a significant interest in educating children.  Children represent the future
workforce of the country and can be important economic participants.
Additionally, because the program was separate from No Child Left Be-
hind, it is unlikely that old NCLB funds would be withdrawn for failure
to adopt the Common Core.199  As such, there was no Dole rational rela-
tion problem or a Sebelius problem of conditioning preexisting funds on
new conditions.
194 These grants include, for example, certain Race to the Top grants, past NCLB grants,
and new Every Student Succeeds Act grants.
195 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 17, at R
6–9; see also Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 20, at 6–9. R
196 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 17, at R
6–9; see also Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 20, at 6–9. R
197 See Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 20, at 9. R
198 See supra Part IV.A.2 and accompanying text.
199 See Myths vs. Facts, supra note 191. R
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The government’s argument highlighted a contradiction in Jindal’s
complaint that any future governor or plaintiff would need to address.
Jindal argued that education is a state matter in which the government
has no interest; however, he simultaneously argued that the federal gov-
ernment owed the state money so that the state could properly educate its
students.200  In essence, he denied that there is a federal interest in educa-
tion but argued there is such an interest as to require funding.  This con-
tradiction weakened the Governor’s argument.
Ultimately, if a future plaintiff follows Jindal’s template, she is un-
likely to succeed.  Jindal did not show that Louisiana would reject the
Common Core or that it has even been forced on the state.  Louisiana
voluntarily adopted the Common Core before joining RTTT, and even if
it were to leave the Common Core consortium, it could still qualify to
receive numerous federal grants for education.  Failure to comply may
lead to sacrificing some federal funds available under some discretionary
grants, but those amounts are likely insignificant.  As a result, any future
challenge in a different circuit on the same grounds is highly unlikely to
be successful.
C. Broad-Based Policy Impact of a Decision
Although this case was dropped, it could have long-term broad-
based policy impacts on the rest of the country.  Some of the policy im-
plications of a decision are explored below.
The first possibility is that this claim is never revived by another
state in the same or different circuit or that it is revived by another state
in the same or different circuit but is unsuccessful, so the law is upheld
as non-coercive.  If this happens, those who object to the Common Core
will attempt to find another legal route to weaken it.  States that do not
wish to adopt the Common Core will be allowed to opt out, but they will
be at a disadvantage in the competition for federal Race to the Top funds.
Furthermore, a decision in favor of the Department of Education will
more strongly embed both Race to the Top and Common Core as na-
tional education programs.  Although the country will be closer to a na-
tionalized curriculum, states will retain independence in curricular
decisions and develop a more common set of standards.  While the actual
merits of the policy of both Common Core and Race to the Top are
outside the scope of this Note, finding the law to be non-coercive would
strengthen the backbone of the programs and likely increase the role of
the Common Core in classrooms.  Furthermore, such a finding would
reinforce the role of the federal government in education and would mark
200 This argument is advanced by the author.  The Department of Education did not ad-
vance this argument in its briefs.
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a success for the Obama Administration and Democrats going into the
2016 election cycle.
The second possibility is that another governor or elected official in
a different circuit brings the same challenge, and the court finds that
tying Race to the Top and Common Core together is coercive.  If that
official succeeds, the programs will no longer be tied together and the
Department of Education will no longer be able to use adoption of the
Common Core as a factor in granting state education awards.  This will
likely lead to many states opting out of the Common Core and could
return the country to a “race to the bottom” mentality, as states would
seek to drop their standards to show improvement.  States would regain
greater independence in education, and the decision would strike a blow
to the hopes of creating a national education system.  Furthermore, it
would severely limit the role of the federal government in education over
the long term.  In sum, the federal role in education would be limited and
there would be limited national education standards, but education would
return closer to its roots at the inception of the country.  In the 2016
election cycle, the decision would likely be used by Republicans to show
how the Obama Administration and Democrats attempted to exceed their
authority to govern state decisions. Democrats would attempt to distance
themselves from the programs and would likely suggest new education
plans, which could cause further delay towards educational reform.
In sum, tying Race to the Top and Common Core together is most
likely to be upheld.  Regardless of the outcome, however, the decision
will likely be challenged and could very well reach the Supreme Court.
Any decision would add another layer to the coercion analysis and could
govern the future of education in the country for decades to come.
CONCLUSION
The history of federal involvement in education in the United States
is, relatively speaking, fairly short.201  Education has long been consid-
ered a state and local issue.  The Common Core and federal efforts to
improve a failing education system have been met with great resistance.
The case in Louisiana highlights this conflict.  As noted above, Louisiana
claims the federal government has coerced it into accepting the Common
Core by using Race to the Top funds as incentives to adopt it.  However,
for the reasons noted above, any state that would challenge the Common
Core has a significant challenge.  Ultimately, a court faced with this chal-
lenge should find that there is no coercion under existing Supreme Court
precedents, since the Common Core is merely a set of standards and not
a federal curriculum imposed on the states, and because the funds that
201 See generally RAPP, supra note 19, § 5.01. R
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states might forgo in applying for certain discretionary grants would be
minimal.
A ruling in favor of a challenging state, however, could have a seis-
mic impact on the education system in the United States.  Many con-
servative states would likely opt out of the Common Core, again creating
an uneven playing field for receiving funds.  Furthermore, if enough
states opt out, it may spell the end for the Common Core and potentially
even RTTT, since evaluating states against each other will become diffi-
cult, if not impossible.  It is unclear what impact such events would have
on students, as the net impact of the Common Core on students is not yet
clear.  However, it would clearly force the next president or Congress to
come up with an entirely new educational policy and manner of
implementation.
A decision against a challenging state would likely reaffirm the
place of both RTTT and the Common Core, especially given that it
would be the second such time this argument failed.  Fewer states would
choose to opt out and there would be a more intricately linked national
curriculum.  The policy benefits, as noted above, are not yet clear, as we
do not know whether the Common Core is good for students.  Nonethe-
less, it would give education and education policymakers a clear plan for
the next few decades.
Regardless of the outcome, the most interesting irony of this debate
is the logic of any state challenging the connection between Race to the
Top and Common Core.  States claiming coercion are essentially arguing
that education is a state function in which the federal government has no
interest; however, those states are also arguing that the federal govern-
ment owes them money to properly educate their students.  Such an argu-
ment, in its essence, would seem difficult to support.  As such, regardless
of whether one believes the Common Core is good policy, it is unlikely
that a court would see the federal government as forcing it on states in
violation of the law.
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